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COMMENTS 
CIVIL PROCEDURE - COMPENSATION OF WITNESSES IN A CIVIL 
AoTION-As the amount and complexity of litigation has increased, 
there have been corresponding increases in demands for added com-
pensation of witnesses. Like the juror, the witness often receives the 
time-honored answer that he cannot be heard to complain that his 
compensation is inadequate; the administration of justice is a mutual 
benefit to all members of the community, and each is under a public 
duty to further it 
At common law witnesses received no compensation.1 Time spent 
in testifying was held to be claimed by the public as a tax, paid by 
the witness to the system of law which protected the rights of all.2 
Statutory provisions gradually were enacted, providing for various 
degrees o~ compensation. 3 Today, there are such statutory provisions 
in every state as well as in the federal courts. The area is fraught with 
controversies and bears examination. 
I. The Ordinary Witness 
The ordinary witness is one who has personal lmowledge of matters 
of fact pertaining to the case; on the witness stand he relates these 
facts. This is in contrast to the expert, who primarily gives opinion 
concerning the significance of facts. In general, the compensation of 
the ordinary witness includes a specified amount per day plus an addi-
tional mileage fee. Per diem rates range from 50 cents in Connecticut, 4 
New Jersey,5 and Virginia6 to six dollars in Utah.7 Several states have 
1 39 L.R.A. 116 (1898). 
2 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468 (1919). 
8 5 Eliz., c. 9, §12 (1562), providing for compensation " .. . according to his or their 
countenance or calling such reasonable sum of money for his or their costs and cbar?es, as 
having regard to the distance of the places is necessary to be allowed in that behalf.' 
4 Conn. Stat. (1949) §3611. 
5 N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 22, c. 1, §4. 
6 Va. Code (1950) §14-187. 
7 Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, c. 5, §4. Other statutes provide the following per 
diem rates: 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1821: $4; Ala. Code (1940) tit. 11, §44: $1.50; 
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §34-131: $1.50; Ark. Stat. (1947) §28.524: $1.50; Del. Code 
(1935) c. 156, §19: $2; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1943) tit. 7, §90.14: $2; Ga. Code Ann. (1949) 
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a special rate for half days. 8 Fees depend on the class of county in 
Colorado,9 while North Carolina declares that the county board of 
commissioners shall :6x compensation within a range of one to three 
dollars per day, but if the witness attends a trial outside of his county 
of residence, the statute specifies the rate.10 Generally, the fees of 
voluntary witnesses are allowed as costs, regardless of whether they 
come from beyond the reach of subpoena, 11 but some courts limit costs 
to subpoenaed witnesses.12 In New York, the Civil Practice Act speci-
fies that a witness will get one dollar per day, if subpoenaed; otherwise, 
he will receive 50 cents.13 California is the only state in which the 
statute declares that the state may require the services of witnesses, 
with or without compensation.14 In general, where testimony is worth-
less and in substance inadmissible, no fees are taxed in costs.15 If a 
subpoenaed witness attends and is deemed necessary to an issue pre-
sented and then the issue is abandoned and the witness is not sworn 
because of this, compensation is nevertheless customarily allowed.16 
However, a party cannot call an unnecessary number of witnesses and 
the court can exercise discretion as to the number of witnesses for 
which the prevailing party shall be allowed to tax costs.17 
Reimbursement for mileage traveled also varies greatly. Georgia 
offers none,1 8 whereas Idaho gives an allowance of 25 cents per mile for 
§1501: 75 cents; Idaho Code Ann. (1948) tit. 9, §1601: $3; ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 
1951) c. 53, §65: $1; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1946 Replacement) §2.1710: $1.25; Iowa 
Code Ann. (1946) §622.69: $2; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §28-125: $1.50; Ky. Stat. 
(1948) tit. 38, §421.010: $1; La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3661: $1.50; Me. Rev. 
Stat. (1944) c. 100, §129: $2; Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 35, §16: $1; Mass. Laws Ann. 
(1952 Supp.) c. 262, §29: $3; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §357.22: $1; Miss. Code Ann. 
(1942) §3953: $1.50; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 25, §404: $3; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
(1943, reissue, 1952) §33-139: $2; Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) §8490: $2; 
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 392, §16: $3; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §31-0116: $2; Ohio 
Rev. Code (1953) §2335.06: $1; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 28, §81: $1; Ore. Comp. Laws 
Ann. (1940) §87-961: $2; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.2: $3; R.I. 
Acts and Resolves (1939) c. 715, §7: $1.50; S.C. Code (1952) §27-603: $1; S.D. Code 
(1939) §36.0401: $2; Tenn. Code Ann. (1934) §9799: l; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
(Vernon, 1925) art. 3708: $1; Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,522: $2.50; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) 
§2.40.010: $4; W.Va. Code (1949) §5833: $1; Wis. Stat. (1951) §325.05: $5. 
81\1ich. Stat. Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.2557: $5 per day and $2.50 per half day; Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-3701: $2 per day and $1.50 per half day. 
o Colo. Stat. (1935) c. 66, §46. Range is from $1.50 to $2.50 per day. 
10 N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52. 
11 Marks v. Merrill Paper Co., (7th Cir. 1913) 203 F. 16. 
12 Lillienthal v. So. Cal. Ry. Co., (D.C. Cal. 1894) 61 F. 622. 
13 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §1539. 
14 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1951) tit. 1, §204. 
15Wollenberger v. Hoover, 346 ill. 511, 179 N.E. 42 (1931). 
16 Jones v. Antrim Circuit Judge, 223 Mich. 141, 193 N.W. 873 (1923). 
17 Kane v. Luckman, (D.C. Iowa 1904) 131 F. 609. 
18 Ga. Code (1949) §1501. But in Dickerson v. Mangham, 194 Ga. 466, 22 S.E. 
(2d) 88 (1942), the court stated that disinterested witnesses should be compensated for 
travel time and expense. 
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the distance one way between the place of residence of the witness and 
the place of trial.19 The majority of statutes base the mileage rate on 
a to-and-from computation, with the most usual figure being that of 
five cents per mile.20 Ordinarily, mileage out of the state is not tax-
able. 21 For travel in the state, mileage is normally allowed in taxing 
costs, whether or not the witness is subpoenaed.22 However, some 
states either by judicial limitation23 or by statute24 have established 
otherwise. North Carolina specifies that the county board of commis-
sioners £x the rate, within a maximum of five cents per mile on a round 
trip basis.25 In Maryland, mileage allowance depends on the county.26 
A few jurisdictions do not allow any mileage at all within a specified 
radius of the place of trial, usually less than twenty miles.27 In the 
19 Idaho Code Ann. (1948) tit. 9, §1601. 
20 The following compensation rates are on a per mile basis (asterisks denote payment 
for one way only): 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1821: seven cents; Ala. Code (1940) 
tit. 11, §44: five cents; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §34-131: fifteen cents*; Colo. Stat. (1935) 
c. 66, §47: fifteen cents*; Del. Code (1935) c. 156, §19: three cents; Fla. Stat. Ann. 
(1943) §90.14: five cents; ID. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 53, §65: five cents; Iowa Code Ann. 
(1946) §622.69: fiye cents; Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) §28-125: five cents; La. Rev. Stat. 
(Dart, 1950) §13.3661: five cents; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 100, §129: six cents; Mass. 
Laws Ann. (1952 Supp.) c. 262, §29: five cents; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.2557: 
ten cents*; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §257.22: six cents; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3953: 
five cents; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §491.280: five cents; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 
(1947) tit. 25, §404: seven cents; Neb. Stat. (1943, reissue 1952) §33-139: five cents; 
Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1931-1941) §8490: fifteen cents*; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 
22, c. 1, §4: one dollar "for every thirty miles from and to his or her place of residence"; 
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §20-104: five cents; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §31-0116: ten 
cents; Ohio Rev. Code (1953) §2335.06: five cents; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 28, §81: five 
cents; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §87-964, as amended Ore. Laws 1949: eight cents; 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.4: five cents; R.I. Acts and Resolves 
(1939) c. 715, §7: ten cents; S.C. Code (1952) §27-603: five cents; S.D. Code (1939) 
§36.0401: ten cents*; Tenn. Code Ann. (1934) §9799: four cents; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3708: six cents; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, c. 5, §4: 
twenty cents*; Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,522: six cents; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §2.04.010: 
ten cents; W.Va. Code (1949) §5833: five cents; Wis. Stat. (1951) §325.05: five cents; 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. (1945) §3-3701: ten cents. 
21 Woodard v. Chicago, R.I. and Pac. Ry. Co., 193 Iowa 516, 185 N.W. 978 (1921). 
22 In re Estate of Hnlme, 185 Iowa 1219, 171 N.W. 599 (1919). 
23 Daloia v. Boyd, 16 Wash. (2d) 439, 133 P. (2d) 950 (1943); Barber v. Parsons, 
145 Mass. 203, 13 N.E. 491 (1887) (travel fees taxed only when witness is summoned). 
24Ark. Stat. (1947) §§28.526, 28.527: no mileage to persons within the county where 
the trial is being held. Five cents per mile to attend outside the county of the witness' 
residence. But see Ind. Stat. Ann. (1946 Replacement) §1710: five cents per mile both 
ways "not to be computed beyond the limits of adjoining county." 
25 N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52. 
26 Md. Code Ann. (1951) art. 35, §16: mileage depends on the county, ranging from 
"itinerant" charges to ten cents per mile based on the witness' distance from the county seat. 
27 Ky. Stat. (1948) §421.010: four cents per mile going and returning, when tlie wit-
ness resides more than twenty miles away; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 392, §16: six cents 
per mile each way where the witness has to leave the town· or city in which he resides in 
order to testify; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §1539: eight cents per mile one 
way if the witness lives more than three miles from the trial; Va. Code (1950) §14-187: 
four cents per mile to and from point "beyond ten miles necessarily traveled to the place 
of attendance." 
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federal courts, a few cases allow costs for the entire mileage of wit-
nesses, regardless of the distance traveled or the fact that the witnesses 
might come from outside the district or state.28 But the great majority 
of decisions hold that mileage fees are taxable only as far as the 
subpoena will run.29 
From all of this data one conclusion is obvious: the witness will 
usually be attending a trial at a financial sacrifice. This is especially 
true if he lives comparatively far from the place of trial and is forced 
to stay overnight. Several states have attempted to alleviate this situa-
tion by providing for special allowances for overnight shelter and extra 
meal expense.30 A provision in Missouri allows the witness an addi-
tional sum if he testifies outside the county of his residence. 31 All of 
these problems are magnified when the person testifying is an "expert." 
II. The Expert Witness 
Correlative with the increasing complexity of society has been a 
greater complexity in litigations, entailing more and more testimony of 
a technical character. This has resulted in great pressure to furnish 
added compensation for expert witnesses. Generally, a witness having 
personal knowledge is required to attend court without pay other than 
that provided by statute.32 He may be required to testify regarding 
matters within his knowledge, even though he has obtained superior 
knowledge through experience and special training.33 For instance, a 
doctor who witnesses an accident and renders first aid must testify as 
to the condition of the person injured; he is not entitled to demand 
extra compensation because he is more qualified than the layman to 
testify on such matters. 34 • 
But when a person not directly connected with the facts of a case 
gives testimony of a technical character, the real problem of added 
compensation for experts comes into focus. The expert can be best 
28 Morris-Turner Live Stock Co. v. Director General of Railroads, (D.C. Mont. 1920) 
266 F. 600. 
20 Friedman v. Washburn Co., (7th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 959. 
30 La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3661: a person resicfing outside of the parish 
wherein the case is pending who is required to stay overnight is allowed $3.50 for hotel 
and meal expense; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, §416.6: where witness 
resides more than fifty miles from the proceeding and is necessarily absent from one day to 
the next, $3 per night for lodging. 
31 Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1952) §491.280: $1.50 per day in the county of the 
witness' residence, and $2 per day outside the county; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §20-104: 
$1 per day in the county of the witness' residence, and $2 per day outside of the county. 
But see Indiana statute, note 24 supra. 
32 McClenahan v. Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 P. 454 (1922). 
33 Dixon v. People, 168 ID. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897). 
34 Burnett v. Freeman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S.W. 121 (1907). 
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defined as " a witness otherwise unconnected with the case who 
because of his . . . special qualifications is called to give in evidence 
his expert opinion, either based on facts, or on the result of examination 
of material or data, submitted to him for the purpose."35 In dealing 
with these problems, there appear to be four categorical approaches. 
(I) The expert is compensated as an ordinary witness. Any additional 
compensation must be paid by the party calling the witness. This is 
by far the majority approach.36 (2) The expert is compensated as an 
ordinary witness, and a contract for any additional compensation is 
void for want of consideration37 or illegal.38 Making such added com-
pensation illegal has little effect, for the statute can be readily circum-
vented through the device of consultation fees. (3) Several statutes 
specifically allow additional compensation for experts, some limiting 
35 111 J.P. 144 (1947). 
36Alabama: An expert "may be compelled to ... testify ••• without ... tender of 
compensation other than the per diem and mileage allowed to [ordinary] witnesses." Ala. 
Code (1940) tit. 7, §366. Contract for additional compensation is valid. Hartley v. 
Alabama Nat. Bank, 247 Ala. 651, 25 S. (2d) 680 (1946). Arkansas: An expert cannot 
demand extra compensation. Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895). 
Georgia: An expert subpoenaed is not entitled to more fees than an ordinary witness. 
Schofield v. Little, 2 Ga. App. 286, 58 S.E. 666 (1907). Illinois: Expert witnesses are in 
the same position as others with respect to their fees. Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. 
Schmidt, 395 ill. 316, 69 N.E. (2d) 689 (1946). Indiana: An expert can be compelled 
to testify "in relation to any matter, whenever such opinion is material evidence relevant 
to an issue on trial . . . without compensation other than [that] allowed by law." Ind. 
Stat. 4nn. (1946 Replacement) §2.1722. Persons who have experience in any particular 
business may be called as experts. Fort Wayne v. Coombs, 107 Ind. 75, 7 N.E. 743 (1886). 
Kentucky: An expert may be subpoenaed and required to attend without the guarantee of 
any compensation over and above the statutory witness fee. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 
291 Ky. 216, 163 S.W. (2d) 493 (1942). Missouri: Contract to pay expert more is not 
invalid as against "public policy." Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 
1032, 156 S.W. (2d) 597 (1941). New York: Fees for experts in excess of regular statu-
tory amount must be borne by the party calling the expert. In re Greco's Estate, 190 Misc. 
769, 78 N.Y.S. (2d) 429 (1947). Pennsylvania: Expert can receive additional compensa-
tion, but it shall not be taxable as costs. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952 Supp.) tit. 28, 
§416.9. See Lance v. Luzerne County Mfrs. Assn., 366 Pa. 398, 77 A. (2d) 386 (1951). 
Texas: Plaintiff not entitled to recover for fees paid in obtaining expert testimony. Gulf, 
C. and S.F. Ry. Co. v. Dooley, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 131 S.W. 831 (1910). West 
Virginia: An expert "\vitness may be compelled to testify as to matters of professional opinion 
or as to special knowledge gained by reason of his professional training or experience with-
out a fee other than that of an ordinary witness. Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W.Va. 
184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929). United States: Additional amounts paid to expert witnesses 
cannot be allowed as costs in the federal courts. Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. and 0. 
Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 52 S.Ct. 223 (1932). 
37 Connecticut: Agreement to pay witness more than legal fees will not ordinarily be 
enforced; exceptional cases will be considered. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857). 
38 Michigan: No expert witness shall receive a sum in excess of ordinary witness fee 
unless court awards a larger sum. Any witness who directly or indirectly receives a larger 
sum and any person paying such sum shall be guilty of contempt of court. Mich. Stat. 
Ann. (1951 Supp.) §27.918. Nebraska: A special contract to pay more than the regular 
witness fee is illegal and void. State v. First Bank of Nickerson, 114 Neb. 423, 207 N.W. 
674 (1926). 
1953] COMMENTS 117 
it to a certain maximum amount:39 and others leaving the payment to 
the discretion of the court.40 Additional compensation can be paid, 
though the person also testifies to facts of the case as an ordinary 
witness,41 but there is disagreement as to whether he has to be called 
as an expert in order to receive added fees.42 ( 4) Finally, California 
permits added compensation for experts appointed by the court.43 It 
is generally agreed in all jurisdictions that the expert can recover fees 
for work involved in rendering an opinion from the party for whom 
the work is performed;44 a very common example is a chemical analysis 
done upon request. 
Various policy considerations have been offered to support or con-
trovert added compensation. It has been argued that the expert's time 
is especially valuable to him.45 However, the hardship is relatively no 
39 Florida: Expert allowed reasonable amount "not in excess of ten dollars per hour 
from time of reporting to place of trial until conclusion of his testimony." Fla. Stat. Ann. 
(1943) as amended 1949, §90.231. The judge shall determine the amount, and it shall 
be taxed as costs. See Daytona Beach v. Humphreys, (Fla. 1951) 53 S. (2d) 871. Iowa: 
Expert witnesses "shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with 
reference to the value of the time employed and the degree of learning or skill required; 
but such additional compensation shall not exceed four dollars per day. . • ." Iowa Code 
Ann. (1946) §622.72. Maine: " ••• The court in its discretion, may allow •.• a sum not 
exceeding $25 per day for the attendance of any expert witness. • . ." Me. Rev. Stat. 
(1944) c. 100, §129. 
40 Colorado: Courts may allow experts amounts which the courts deem proper. Denver 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comrs., 105 Colo. 366, 98 P. (2d) 283 (1940). 
Delaware: Fees of experts fixed by court in its discretion and taxed as part of the costs. 
Del. Code (1935) c. 129, §21. Louisiana: Expert witnesses "shall receive additional 
compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the value of the time employed 
and the degree of learning or skill required." La. Rev. Stat. (Dart, 1950) §13.3666. 
Court can restrain litigant where he attempts to summon uselessly a number of expert 
witnesses. Stem v. Lanng, 106 La. 738, 31 S. 303 (1901). For taxing as costs, see Levy 
v. McWilliams, 13 La. App. 444, 129 S. 170 (1930). Michigan: See note 38 supra. $50 
per day fee allowed in Security Life Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 221 Mich. 496, 191 N.W. 216 
(1922). Minnesota: Judge of any court of record may allow expert "such fees or com-
pensation as, in his judgment, may be just and reasonable." Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) 
§357.25. See Le Mere v. McHale, 30 Minn. 410, 15 N.W. 682 (1883), for construction 
of "expert." See also 14 MrnN. L. REv. 432 (1930). North Carolina: ''Experts, when 
compelled to attend and testify, shall be allowed such compensation and mileage as the 
court may in its discretion order." N.C. Stat. (1953) §6-52. See Connor v. Hayworth & 
Cole, 206 N.C. 721, 175 S.E. 140 (1934). Vermont: "In state causes extra compensation 
may be allowed to expert witnesses" when so ordered by the court; "compensation will be 
fixed by the court before whom the trial is had." Vt. Stat. (1947) §10,524. 
41 Attrep v. Horecky, (La. App. 1937) 177 S. 379. 
42 Must be called as expert: Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa 646 (1875). Contra: 
Suthon v. Laws, 132 La. 207, 61 S. 204 (1913). 
43 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) tit. 1, §1871. Court can appoint one or more 
experts, on motion of either party or of the court. Court fixes compensation, if any, and 
charges to parties in such portion as court shall determine and it may thereafter be taxed 
and allowed in like manner as other costs. Experts produced by parties shall be entitled 
only to ordinary witness fees, which shall be taxed as other witness fees. 
44 Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); 8 W1GMORE, 
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2203 (1940). 
45 Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). 
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greater on the expert than on the ordinary person; each loses a day's 
labor. Sometimes a constitutional argument is made that the knowl-
edge of the expert is his property and that taking it without just com-
pensation violates due process under the federal and most state con-
stitutions; there is a benefit conferred for which there should be 
payment.46 This presupposes that opinion is property, a concept that 
seems tenuous at best. A more cogent reason for paying the expert 
added compensation is that otherwise there will be too great a burden 
on well-known men in their respective fields.47 This argument is in 
part rebutted by the fact that since an overburdened expert is likely to 
be disgruntled, litigants will be cautious in asking such persons to 
testify. Finally, it has been argued that the opinion of the expert is 
his means of livelihood, and he should not Be compelled to contribute 
it.48 Stryker has said, "The physician has as much right to be com-
pensated for his store of goods, namely, his knowledge, as has the 
grocer for his cans of tomatoes or his green vegetables on his shelves."40 
Opponents of added compensation contend that it is difficult to 
distinguish opinion from fact; some say opinion is fact for the con-
sideration of the court, whereas others say facts are opinions of wit-
nesses as to circumstances.50 Another difficulty often mentioned is 
fixing a scale of pay for various experts. England has such a scale, 
which has been much criticized,51 but this matter has not confronted 
American courts, for additional compensation where allowed is usually 
at the discretion of the court.52 It is also argued that though the person 
calling the expert may realize benefit from his . knowledge without 
paying for it, the primary benefit is in the betterment of judicial ad-
ministration. 53 This suggests again the basis of all arguments against 
extra compensation for expert witnesses: the administration of justice 
is a mutual benefit to all members of the community, and each indi-
vidual is under a public duty to give the best testimony possible to 
further justice.54 
46 Pennsylvania Company v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918). 
47 Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). 
48 United States v. Cooper, 21 D.C. 491 (1893). 
49 STRYKER, CouRTS AND DOCTORS 166 (1932). 
50 See 50 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 346 (1902). 
51See 111 J.P. 144 (1947); 112 J.P. 600 (1948). See also, Mitchell, "Witnesses' 
Expenses," 23 N.Z.L.J. 166 (1947). 
52 See notes 39 and 40 supra. 
53 Dixon v. People, 168 ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897). 
54 See 8 WrnMoBE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2203 (1940); Philler v. Waukesha County, 
139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909). 
1953] COMMENTS 119 
However, this does not meet the problem of the "professional" 
witness, who in the ordinary practice of his profession acquires knowl-
edge of the facts of the case before the court and is called upon to give 
evidence as to these facts or to express an opinion based on his general 
professional knowledge and experience. Nor does it adequately rebut 
the argument that knowledge is the stock in trade of the expert, which, 
it is contended, no litigant should obtain without reasonable com-
pensation. 
One solution to this dilemma has been the making of compensa-
tion contracts between a litigant and his expert witness. In some states 
such contracts are illegal.55 A great many more hold that since a wit-
ness owes a legal duty to testify, these contracts are unenforceable 
because the performance of a legal duty is not consideration.56 How-
ever, this would not apply where the witness is in another state or is 
privileged.57 But as already shown, a great many states do allow the 
making of such contracts.58 The expert does not owe a legal duty to 
give more than facts observed, so it would seem that a contract for 
expert testimony is not against public policy.59 Contingent contracts 
in preparing evidence, however, have been in large part condemned 
on the basis that they breed perjury and fabrication. 60 On the other 
hand, it has been contended that there is no reason to strike down such 
agreements where there is no evidence of abuse, and that they greatly 
aid the poor man who ordinarily could not afford an expert's services.61 
In this entire area, it is unfortunate that statutes either giving or 
allowing extra fees seem to be directed solely toward protecting the 
expert by providing him with adequate compensation. The approach 
should rather consider the judicial system as a whole, with two major 
problems in mind: (I) should any additional compensation be paid 
at all? and (2) if paid, should such compensation be taxed as costs? 
From the standpoint of sound judicial administration, there· are 
several strong reasons why the expert should not receive additional 
55 Note 38 supra. 
56 See note 37 supra; Klepper v. Klepper, 199 Mo. App. 294, 202 S.W. 593 (1918). 
57 16 A.L.R. 1442 (1922). 
58 Note 36 supra. 
59 Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934). But see Philler v. 
Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909) (a witness may be required to 
give testimony as to his professional opinion). 
60 Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911). Agreements making 
fee contingent on result of litigation are void. Pelkey v. Hodge, 112 Cal. App. 424, 296 
P. 908 (1931). 
61 Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W. (2d) 597 
(1941). 
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compensation. Because he is selected, compensated, and coached by 
one party, the expert witness may not be sufficiently unbiased and 
disinterested. On this basis, the whole idea of expert testimony has 
been severely criticized.62 Another criticism is that unlimited expert 
testimony is economically unjust because it favors the wealthy litigant.63 
It seems appropriate, then, that in any statutory scheme allowing indi-
viduals to pay experts additional compensation, courts should have 
some supervision over the amount. One suggestion is to have the court 
approve the fee of the expert before testimony is admitted. This would 
result in less inequality arising from differences in economic status and 
might have the effect of encouraging more objective testimony. But 
there will still be partisanship in favor of the person paying the fee. 
Such bias is not necessarily based on the idea of selling to the highest 
bidder; more likely, it stems from natural feelings of loyalty tq the 
person paying the bill, plus the witness' desire that his benefactor "get 
h . , th,, 1s moneys wor . 
A solution to these problems has been proposed by writers urging 
that experts be compensated entirely by the state.64 This presents the 
second issue of whether compensation paid should be taxed as costs. 
Absent statutes, there is generally no taxing as costs because the expert 
can sell his services and cannot by law be required to testify as an 
expert in most jurisdictions allowing extra compensation.65 Even 
though experts were to be limited on each side, the cost of litigation 
would nevertheless be substantially increased, especially considering 
estimates so often given that over sixty percent of all cases require 
expert testimony.66 Because of the additional state expense, some 
writers take a limited view of state compensation, believing that only 
in the case of court-appointed experts should the state pay more than 
ordinary fees. This cuts the cost for the state, yet assures both parties 
of the availability of expert testimony, regardless of £nancial means. 
The American Law Institute has proposed this procedure: 
"The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the 
judge shall be :fixed at a reasonable amount. ... In a civil action 
it shall be paid as the judge shall order; he may order that it be 
62 See 38 CoL. L. RBv. 369 (1938). 
63 1 TEX. LAW AND LEGIS. 100 (1947). 
64 See 12 A.B.A.J. 150 (1926); Friedman, ''Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and 
Reformation," 19 YALE L.J. 247 (1910). 
65 Note 36 SUJ2ra. See also Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Transit 
Development Co., (.2d Cir. 1919) 261 F. 792; 16 A.L.R. 1442 (.1922). 
66 WELLMAN, A:!i.T OF Cnoss ExAM:l:NATION, 4th ed., 76 (1936); Hamo, "Uniform 
Expert Testimony Act," 21 J. AM.. JUD. Soc. 156 (1938). 
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paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as he 
shall prescribe, or that the proportion of any party be paid by 
[insert name of the proper authority], and that, after payment by 
the parties or [insert name of the public authority] or both, all or 
part or none of it be taxed as costs in the public action. Any wit-
ness appointed by the judge who receives any compensation other 
than that fu:ed by the judge and any person who pays or offers or 
promises to pay such other compensation shall be guilty of con-
tempt of court. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but 
not appointed by the judge shall be paid by the party calling him 
but shall not be taxed as costs in the action."67 
California has an analogous provision in its statutes, with the added 
proviso that the court before or during the trial may limit the number 
of witnesses to be called by any party.68 In theory this seems to be a 
very good compromise plan; however, its practicality is questionable in 
that there is the complex problem of which experts the court will 
appoint and upon whose recommendation the court will choose. If the 
court appoints experts recommended by both sides, the dilemma of 
excessive litigation costs arises. The calling of many expert witnesses 
might make litigation so expensive that valid causes of action are 
frustrated. However, if a statute is to authorize the taxing of expert 
fees as costs, it seems fair that the court should have some supervision 
over the amount. 
This leads into a possible middle ground of achieving independence 
of expert witnesses and yet not burdening the state with excessive fees. 
Interrogatories and answers or depositions taken pursuant to commis-
sion could be admitted, regardless of the presence of the witness within 
the range of process of the court. Costs would be cut down and in 
addition the expert would not be losing much time in traveling to the 
trial and testifying in person, for the interrogatories and depositions 
could be taken at his convenience. Unfortunately, the practicality of 
this solution is limited, for it is generally agreed that no matter how 
carefully a judge instructs a jury, interrogatories and depositions do 
not carry as much weight with the jury as actual witnesses. 
III. Conclusion 
There is no complete solution to the difficulties involved in com-
pensation of witnesses. The central problem is one of balance; litiga-
67 A.L.I. MoDEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 410 (1942). 
68 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) tit. 1, §1871. See note 43 supra. 
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tion costs should not be so cheap that there is no deterrent to frivolous 
actions and yet costs should not be so ex<;:essive that valid causes of 
action are frustrated because expert testimony requires increased .financ-
ing. In addition there must be considered the problems of economic 
inequality, the burdens on persons well known in their professions, and 
the fact that knowledge is the "stock in trade" of the expert. Finally, 
it is important to encourage impartiality of the expert. 
It is generally agreed that the expert should at least receive pay for 
preliminary work undertaken in order to give opinion. 69 This is only 
fair; otherwise it would be impossible to get much work of this kind 
done. It is the opinion of this writer that courts should have some 
supervision over the payment of extra compensation by the individual 
parties; this would counter differences in economic status and offset 
the natural bias of the expert toward his employer. As to the extent 
of supervision, the availability of consultation fee agreements is a 
limiting factor. Although the scheme of state appointed experts has 
recently received wide attention, it is laden with difficulties of choosing 
and appointing such experts. 
All proposals for added fees for experts are confronted with the 
basic philosophy of the American judicial system that the administra-
tion of justice is a mutual benefit to all members of the community and 
each individual is under a public duty to give the best testimony pos-
sible to further justice. Although there are economic inequalities in 
allowing private parties to hire their own experts, this argument has 
had somewhat less validity as the general standard of living has risen. 
Opening the door for the taxing of expert fees as part of costs can result 
in an intolerable increase in the cost of litigation. If there is any 
increase at all, it should be uniform for all witnesses. By and large, 
statutes now in force allow ordinary witnesses' fees on a scale of .fifty 
or seventy-five years ago. The value of the dollar has changed so that 
these fees are in reality nominal. It is in this area that the most effec-
tive pressure can be exerted for increasing compensation for witnesses. 
But to yield to demands for increasing the fees given for expert testi-
mony opens the door to manifold problems. 
David W. Belin, S.Ed. 
69 Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); 8 W1GMORE, 
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2203 (1940). 
